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Abstract— In this paper, we introduce a new quadcopter fail-
safe flight solution that can perform the same four controllable
degrees-of-freedom flight as a regular multirotor even when
a single thruster fails. The new solution employs a novel
multirotor platform known as the T 3-Multirotor and utilizes a
distinctive strategy of actively controlling the center of gravity
position to restore the nominal flight performance. A dedicated
control structure is introduced, along with a detailed analysis of
the dynamic characteristics of the platform that change during
emergency flights. Experimental results are provided to validate
the feasibility of the proposed fail-safe flight strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-rotor UAVs (hereafter called ‘multirotors’) have var-
ious fuselage shapes depending on the number of thrusters,
but they all share the same principle of controlling flight
through four control inputs: roll, pitch, yaw torque and
overall thrust [1]. Since the number of control inputs is
four, multirotors generally require at least four thrusters,
and severe loss of stability can occur if the number of
available thrusters is reduced to less than four [2]. From this
fact, we can see that the quadcopter configuration with four
thrusters is the minimum requirement for a stable multirotor
flight under general hardware configurations, and it is highly
difficult to maintain a stable flight if one or more thrusters
of the quadcopter fail.
A. Related Works
Although the degradation of the flight performance during
actuator failure is unavoidable in conventional multirotors,
several methods [2]∼[10] have been proposed to address
the failure of multirotor flight. For multirotors with more
than four thrusters [8]∼[10], the platform’s redundancy in
the actuator is applied to recover full degree of multirotor
flight. However, for quadcopters, the number of actuators
available in any motor failure scenario will always be less
than four, so one or more controllable degrees of freedom (c-
DOF) must be given up depending on the number of motors
that have failed. As a result, quadcopter-based fail-safe flight
commonly gives up yaw motion instead of maintaining full
control of three-dimensional translational motion [2]∼[6]
in a single motor failure to prevent collisions with foreign
objects or terrain. This approach prevents the crash and guar-
antees safe return/land, but causes continuous rotation of the
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Fig. 1. The fail-safe flight of the T 3-Multirotor in a single-motor failure
condition (red arrow indicating the faulty motor).
fuselage with payloads or sensors. Therefore, this approach
could cause difficulties for multirotor to continue carrying
out designated missions after motor failure. Also, for multi-
rotor flights utilizing on-board sensors, such as a camera for
visual odometry, continuous camera rotation could drastically
deteriorate the quality of the sensor/navigation data and result
in unstable flight [11].
To solve the yaw rotation problem, the research of [7]
adopted a tilt-rotor-type quadrotor platform with eight c-
DOFs. In this case, both translational and yaw motion
can be controlled even with the quadrotor configuration.
However, this method has the disadvantage of increasing the
weight and power consumption, since the servomotor must
be installed on each and every thruster for fail-safe flight.
B. Contributions and Outline
As a solution of the problems in previous fail-safe flight,
in this paper, we introduce a new quadcopter fail-safe flight
method utilizing the novel multirotor platform called the
T 3-Multirotor (the platforms in Fig. 1).1 First introduced in
[13] and [14], the T 3-Multirotor platform is a fully-actuated
quadcopter platform developed to overcome the dependency
of fuselage attitude on translational motion. By utilizing
the unique mechanical features of the T 3-Multirotor, in this
paper, we introduce a new strategy to restore the nominal
flight performance by actively changing the platform’s center
of gravity position in a single motor failure scenario.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the mechanism and dynamics of the T 3-Multirotor
are introduced. Section III introduces a fail-safe flight strat-
egy, followed by an introduction to the fail-safe controller in
1See https://youtu.be/ePHoqFileuQ for an experimental
video.
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Fig. 2. Schematic of the T 3-Multirotor. The platform consists of three
major parts, TP, FP, and CM, where the relative roll (αr) and pitch (αp)
attitude between TP and FP can be actively modified.
Section IV. In section V, the actual experimental results are
provided with detailed analysis to validate the feasibility of
the proposed method.
II. MECHANISM & DYNAMICS
In this section, we briefly describe the mechanism of the
T 3-Multirotor and introduce the equations of motion (EoMs).
A. Mechanism
Fig. 2 shows the schematic of the T 3-Multirotor. As shown
in Fig. 2-A, the platform consists of three major parts:
Thruster Part (TP), Fuselage Part (FP), and Cross Member
(CM).
The TP consists only of a frame with four arms, four
propeller thrusters, and a single IMU sensor. With thrusters,
the TP can generate attitude control torques and overall thrust
on the same principle as a regular quadcopter. Meanwhile,
the FP consists of the remaining components other than those
mounted on the TP (e.g. battery, mission computer, auxiliary
sensors). Since there are no thrusters on FP, it cannot
generate thrust on its own. Instead, the FP is connected to
the TP via the universal joint mechanism to receive the force
required for flight.
The TP and FP are connected to each of the two rotation
axes of the CM, which is a cross-shaped rigid body with two
orthogonal rotational axes (refer Fig. 2-A and B), whereby
the TP and FP have degrees of freedom in roll and pitch
rotation for the CM, respectively (refer Fig. 2-C and D).
Then, the servomotors are attached to the roll and pitch axes
of CM to actively control the relative attitude α{r,p} ∈ R
(refer Fig. 2 for the definition of α∗). This feature allows the
FP to take an arbitrary attitude independent of the TP while
the TP performs attitude control for translational motion
control as in the conventional multirotor.
As shown in Fig. 3, the structure of the T 3-Multirotor
is not limited to the shape shown in Fig. 2 and may vary
depending on the purpose of the mission. For example, if the
platform needs to interact downward (e.g. cargo transporta-
tion [14], ground observation), a structure with FP at the
Fig. 3. Examples of T 3-Multirotor structures that can vary depending
on mission objectives. T 3-Upright (Left): Case where TP is on top of FP.
T 3-Inverted (Right): Case where FP is on top of TP.
bottom is desirable. On the contrary, in a mission requiring
upward interaction (e.g. in-air object surveillance, interaction
with the ceiling), a structure in which the TP is located at the
bottom is preferable. Despite differences in shape, however,
the two structures have almost identical operating principles
and motion dynamics, thus we can control the system in the
same manner.
B. Platform Dynamics
The equations governing the motion of a T 3-Multirotor are
already known from [13] and [14]. Therefore, in this paper,
we take the final form of the dynamic equations without the
derivation process but explain the physical meaning of the
terms that make up the equation.2
1) Translational EoMs: From the aforementioned previ-
ous researches, we can express the translational EoMs of the
platform as {
X¨T ≈ 1MR(qT )FT + g
X¨F ≈ X¨T
, (1)
where the subscripts (∗)T and (∗)F represent TP and FP,
X∗ = [x1,∗ x2,∗ x3,∗]ᵀ ∈ R3×1 is the position vector, M
is the overall mass of the platform, q∗ = [q1,∗ q2,∗ q3,∗]ᵀ ∈
R3×1 is the Roll-Pitch-Yaw Euler attitude vector, R(q∗) =
Ry(q3,∗)Rp(q2,∗)Rr(q1,∗) ∈ SO(3) is the rotation matrix
from the body frame to the Earth-fixed frame, FT = [0 0 −
FT ]
ᵀ ∈ R3×1 is the thrust force vector generated by the TP
defined in the body frame of the TP, and g = [0 0 g]ᵀ ∈ R3×1
is the gravitational acceleration vector.
From Eq. (1), we can see that the translational motion of
the T 3-Multirotor is determined only by the total thrust FT
and TP attitude qT as in the regular multirotor. Thus, we
define a new vector IX = [qT FT ]ᵀ ∈ R4×1 and manipulate
this vector for controlling the translational motion.
2See https://www.sjlazza.com/post/ra-l-2020 for the
complete process of the dynamics derivation process of the T 3-Multirotor.
2) Rotational EoMs: Also from the previous researches,
we can represent the rotational EoM of the platform as{
JT q¨T ≈ TT + TCT = TO
JF q¨F ≈
(
mF
M
)
(dF × (Rr(αr)Rp(−αp)FT )) + TCF ,
(2)
where J∗ = diag(J1,∗, J2,∗, J3,∗) ∈ R3×3 is the moment
of inertia (MoI), TT = [τ1,T τ2,T τ3,T ]ᵀ ∈ R3×1 is the
torque vector generated by the array of thrusters attached to
the TP, TC∗ ∈ R3×1 is the interactive torque vector acting
from the CM to part (∗) defined in the body frame of the
part (∗), and TO = [τ1,O τ2,O τ3,O]ᵀ is the overall torque
vector which determines the attitudinal motion of the TP. The
symbol m∗ represents the mass of the corresponding part and
d∗ = [0 0 d∗]ᵀ ∈ R3×1 is the distance vector from the O∗
to the Oc defined in the body coordinate of the object (*)
(refer Fig. 2). For α∗, the approximate relationships αr ≈
q1,T−q1,F and αp ≈ q2,T−q2,F generally hold under normal
flight conditions.
The interaction torque TC(∗) consists of the following
subterms:
TC(∗) = Ts,C(∗) + Tf,C(∗), (3)
where Ts,CT = [τrs 0 0]ᵀ and Ts,CF = [0 τps 0]ᵀ are
servo-generated torques, Tf,CT = [0 τp,CT τy,CT ]ᵀ and
Tf,CF = [τr,CF 0 τy,CF ]
ᵀ are the torques transferred by
the CM structure. In the idle relative attitude condition
(α{r,p} = 0), it is known that the interaction torques TidleCT ,
TidleCF are as follows [13], [14].
TidleCT =
 τrs−τps
− J3,FJ3,T+J3,F τ3,T
 ,TidleCF = −TidleCT (4)
And the following relationship is generally established unless
the relative attitude α{r,p} are huge.
TC∗ ≈ TidleC∗ (5)
III. FAIL-SAFE FLIGHT
In this section, we introduce a control strategy that utilizes
the unique feature of the T 3-Multirotor to provide full control
of the multirotor even under single motor failure condition.
Then, we analyze the EoM of the system during fail-safe
flight to understand the altered motion behavior. The method
proposed throughout this paper basically responds to single
motor failure, but a methodology for dealing with failures of
two motors under special circumstances is also introduced.
A. Fail-safe Flight - Strategy
As well known, the translational motion of the conven-
tional multirotor is determined by the overall thrust force and
the fuselage attitude. The attitude and thrust of the multirotor
are generally controlled by u ∈ R4×1 value [1], which is
generated by combining four motor thrusts c0 ∈ R4×1 as
u =
[
TT
FT
]
= A0c0 =

0 l 0 −l
l 0 −l 0
b
k − bk bk − bk
1 1 1 1
 c0, c0 =

F1
F2
F3
F4
 .
(6)
Fig. 4. The dc,{x,y}, the overall CoG position of the platform w.r.t. the
body coordinate system of the TP, can be changed by manipulating the
relative attitude α{r,p}.
The symbol l ∈ R represents the length of the arm frame,
b, k ∈ R represent the torque and force coefficient of the
thruster, and Fi ∈ R ≥ 0 represents the thrust force generated
by Motor i. Here, we can see that there is no redundancy of
c0 in generating the u signal with quadcopter configuration.
Accordingly, it is understood that the arbitrary required u
value cannot be generated if any of the Fi signals constituting
c0 are out of control.
As with the conventional multirotor, we can see from Eq.
(1) that the T 3-Multirotor determines the translational motion
in four terms, qT and FT . Therefore, the T 3-Multirotor also
cannot achieve fully stable flight if the number of actuators is
less than four. However, unlike conventional quadcopters, the
T 3-Multirotor has additional actuators other than thrusters,
which are two servomotors that control relative roll and pitch
attitude α{r,p} between TP and FP. Therefore, if we can
take advantage of two servomotors to generate some of the
components of u independently of c0, then we can use this
feature to obtain additional redundancy in control and utilize
in fail-safe flight.
1) Control redundancy: When controlling the attitude of
the FP via the servomechanism, the center of gravity (CoG)
position with respect to the body coordinate of the TP
changes with α{r,p}. Fig. 4 shows an example of the y-
directional CoG position being changed in accordance of
the relative roll attitude αr. In the same manner, we can also
change the CoG position in the x-direction with relative pitch
attitude αp. The position of the altered CoG with respect to
the TP frame is represented by dC = [d1,C d2,C d3,C ]ᵀ ∈
R3×1, and the relationship between the relative attitudes and
the CoG position is as follows.
dC (αr, αp) =
1
M
(mT z3×1 +mF (dT + Rr(−αr)Rp(αp)(−dF )))
(7)
The symbol zm×n ∈ Rm×n represents the m-by-n-
dimensional zero vector. Then, we can find the relationship
between relative attitude α{r,p} and dc,{x,y} derived from
Eq. (7) as follows. αp = arcsin
(
M
mF
d1,C
dF
)
αr = arcsin
(
1
cos (αp)
M
mF
d2,C
dF
) (8)
From Eq. (8), we can calculate the required servomotor
angles to relocate the CoG position on the (xt − yt) plane
of the TP body coordinate to the desired location.
In the situation where the position of CoG is changing,
the relationship between c0 and u is no longer static and
does not follow the rule of Eq. (6) anymore. Instead, a new
relationship that reflects the change in the position of CoG
is established as follows
τCoG1,T = (l + d2,C)F2 + d2,C (F1 + F3)− (l − d2,C)F4
τCoG2,T = (l − d1,C)F1 − d1,C (F2 + F4)− (l + d1,C)F3
τCoG3,T =
b
k
(F1 − F2 + F3 − F4)
,
(9)
where
TCoGT =
τ
CoG
1,T
τCoG2,T
τCoG3,T
 = TT +
 d2,C−d1,C
0
FT . (10)
From Equations (9) and (10), we can find that not only a
series of Fi values but also d{1,2},C values can be utilized
to generate roll and pitch attitude control torques. Based on
this idea, we can change the way of generating the control
input u from Eq. (6) to
u =
[
TO
FT
]
=
[
TCoGT + ∆d
FT
]
= Aaug(FT )caug +
[
∆d
0
]
, (11)
where Aaug(FT ) ∈ R4×6 is the new relationship between
caug and u, which is expressed as follows:
Aaug(FT ) =

0 l 0 −l 0 FT
l 0 −l 0 −FT 0
b
k − bk bk − bk 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
 . (12)
The symbol caug = [c0ᵀdᵀ]ᵀ ∈ R6×1 is an augmented input
vector, and d = [d1,C d2,C ]ᵀ ∈ R2×1 is the altered x and
y position of the CoG. The term ∆d ∈ R3×1 is the gap
between TO and TCoGT , which is an inertial term that occurs
during the control of d.
To understand ∆d, we need to revisit the rotational
dynamics of the T 3-Multirotor. By applying equations (4)
and (5) to (2), we get the following relationship:
JT q¨T = TO
= TT +
mF dF
M
s(αr)c(αp)−s(αp)
0
FT − JF q¨F . (13)
Next, by applying Eqs. (8) and (10) to (13), we can obtain
the following equation:
TO = TT +FT
 d2,C−d1,C
0
−JF q¨F = TCoGT −JF q¨F . (14)
By comparing Eqs. (11) and (14), we can see that ∆d =
−JF q¨F .
Of the components of TO, ∆d is the only term that cannot
be directly controlled. Therefore we first consider TCoGT as
the only control input for qT control by ignoring the effects
of ∆d, but we will discuss the effects of ∆d during flight
later by discovering the relationship between TO,d and TO.
The symbol (∗)d represents the desired value. Then, from
Eq. (11), we can see that caug has two additional input
redundancies in generating u signal. Based on this, we can
now discuss the fail-safe flight strategy.
2) Fail-safe flight strategy: In the case of a single motor
failure, our strategy is to modify Eq. (11) to exclude the
contribution of the faulty motor in the generation of u,
and utilize one of the components of d instead. During
the process, remaining component of d is fixed to zero
throughout the flight. The strategy can be expressed as the
following equation:
u =
[
TO
FT
]
≈ Ak(FT )ck, (15)
where {
Ak(FT ) = Aaug(FT )Ek
ck = E
ᵀ
kcaug
. (16)
The symbol k = 1, 2, 3, 4 represents the faulty motor, and
Ek ∈ R6×4 represents the exclusion matrix defined as
Ek =
{
I{k,5} (k = 2, 4)
I{k,6} (k = 1, 3)
. (17)
The symbol I{a,b} is a matrix in which two zero row vectors
z1×4 are added to the identity matrix I4 ∈ R4×4, resulting
in all zero components of rows a and b of I{a,b}. In Eq. (17)
we see that Ek is divided into two modes depending on the
faulty motor k. We define this as Mode i (i = 1, 2), where
Mode 1 is the case when k = 2, 4 and Mode 2 is the case
when k = 1, 3.
The role of Ek is to exclude the faulty motor and one
of the components of d from the Eq. (11). This process
allows Ak(FT ) of Eq. (15) to have rank(Ak) = 4, restoring
the system to a full rank even after the motor failure. For
example, in the event when Motor 2 fails, the Mode 1 fail-
safe flight scenario is activated, resulting in an E2 matrix as
follows.
Eᵀ2 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 (18)
Then, Eq. (15) becomes
u ≈ A2(FT )c2 =

0 0 −l FT
l −l 0 0
b/k b/k −b/k 0
1 1 1 0


F1
F3
F4
d2,C
 .
(19)
From Eq. (19), we can calculate the required c2 to generate
ud as
c2,d = A
−1
2 (FT )ud =

1
2lτ2,O,d +
k
4bτ3,O,d +
1
4FT,d
− 12lτ2,O,d + k4bτ3,O,d + 14FT,d
− k2bτ3,O,d + 12FT,d
1
FT,d
τ1,O,d − k2bFT,d τ3,O,d + l2
 .
(20)
The value of d1,C , which is not used in Eq. (20), remains
zero through a separate controller.
In case of dual motor failure, we can configure cjk ∈
R4×1 and Ajk(FT ) ∈ R4×4 by excluding terms and matrix
columns related to the faulty motors j and k and utilizing
both d1,C and d2,C . However, if the combination of failed
motors is {j = 1, k = 3} or {j = 2, k = 4}, rank (Ajk)
becomes 3, which makes nominal 4-c-DOF flight impossible.
But otherwise, the signal cjk,d can always be found to satisfy
all components of ud vector.
B. Fail-safe Flight - Dynamics
In the control process of a multirotor, the ud signal
generated by the flight computer is first converted into ck,d
through A−1k (FT ) in Eq. (15), and then passes the actuator
dynamics to become ck and u. In a conventional multirotor
flight (refer Eq. (6)), the relationship of ud = u holds since
the effects of rotor dynamics are negligible [1].
However, in the case of the T 3-Multirotor, not only the
thrusters but also the servomechanism are implemented to
generate TO value and therefore, the assumption of ud = u
is no longer valid. Taking fail-safe flight for Motor 2 failure
as an example, we can see from Eq. (19) that not only F4
but also d2,C contribute to roll torque generation. Since the
relocation of the CoG position is accompanied by a change
in the relative attitude α{r,p} (refer Eq. (8)), there is a non-
negligible dynamic relationship between τ1,O,d and τ1,O.
Meanwhile, the remaining u terms do not suffer from the
internal dynamics since those terms are still generated only
through the motor thrusters with negligible rotor dynamics
(refer Eq. (19)). Therefore, in this subsection, we investigate
only the EoM of α{r,p}-induced torque channel, by exploring
the relationship between τ1,O,d and τ1,O in the Motor 2
failure scenario (Mode 1). Due to the symmetry of the T 3-
Multirotor structure, the dynamics between τr,O,d and τr,O
derived in Motor 2 failure scenario can also be applied to
explain the behavior of other α{r,p}-induced torque control
channels in different fail-safe flight scenarios.
Prior to investigation, we introduce some constraints dur-
ing fail-safe flight for stable operation.
• Constraint 1: Of the components of u, τ3,O is controlled
to remain small during the fail-safe flight.
• Constraint 2: Of the components of u, FT is controlled
to remain near Mg during the fail-safe flight.
By applying the Constraint 1 to Eq. (19), we can obtain the
following relationship:
F1 + F3 ≈ F4. (21)
Fig. 5. Relationship between τ1,O,d and τ1,O in Mode 1 fail-safe flight.
Then, applying Eq. (21) to the Constraint 2 yields the
following result:
F4 ≈ 1
2
Mg. (22)
From Eqs. (19) and (22), we can have the following equation:
τ1,O ≈Mg
(
d2,C − didle2,C
)
didle2,C =
l
2
. (23)
Eq. (23) shows that the value of d2,C should be biased near
didle2,C to make τ1,O near zero. As a result, αrs and τrs also
should be biased during fail-safe flight. By applying Eq. (23)
to (2), (4) and (8), we can obtain the following representation
of αr and τrs.
αr = α
idle
r + ∆αr , α
idle
r ≈
lM
2mF dF
τrs = τ
idle
rs + ∆τrs , τ
idle
rs =
Mgl
2
(24)
where small-angle approximation (SMA) is applied during
αr derivation.
Fig. 5 shows the overall torque generation process. The
process can be divided into three blocks, Block 1, 2 and 3.
1) Block 1: Block 1 relates to the process of converting
τ1,O,d to αr,d and reverting αr to τ1,O. For conversion, the
τ1,O,d signal is first converted to d2,C,d via Eq. (23) and then
converted to αr,d through Eq. (8). During the conversion
process, αp is kept at zero value. By combining Eqs. (8)
and (23), we can obtain the following conversion equation
between τ1,O and αr.
αr =
1
mF dF g
τ1,O + α
idle
r (25)
In the same way, αr is reverted to τ1,O and utilized for TP
attitude control.
2) Block 2: Block 2 is a controller block for tracking αr,d
generated in Block 1, where we can apply a simple linear
controller (e.g. PID controller). However, to overcome the
bias of τrs identified in Eq. (24) (which is τ idlers ), we first
generate the ∆τrs,d signal through a ‘Servo Ctrler’ block and
then merge the τ idlers value for generating τrs,d signal.
3) Block 3: Block 3 relates to the EoM between servo
torque τrs and relative attitude αr. From Eq. (2), we can
bring the rotational dynamics of the roll channel of TP and
FP as follows.{
J1,T q¨1,T = τ1,T + τrs
J1,F q¨1,F =
mF dF
M FT sinαr cosαp − τrs
(26)
When F2 = 0, F4 has a nearly fixed value by Eq. (22). Thus,
applying Eq. (22) to Eq. (6) brings a nearly fixed τ1,T value
of
τ1,T ≈ − lMg
2
(27)
during fail-safe flight. Then, since αr = q1,T − q1,F and
αp = 0, we can have the following equation from Eq. (26):
α¨r −
(
mF dF g
J1,F
)
αr =
(
J1,T + J1,F
J1,TJ1,F
)
τrs − lMg
2J1,T
, (28)
where aforementioned fail-safe flight constraints (τ3,O ≈ 0,
FT ≈ Mg) and SMA are applied during the development.
Next, by applying Eq. (24) to (28), we obtain the following
linear input/output relationship
∆¨αr −
(
mF dF g
J1,F
)
∆αr =
(
J1,T + J1,F
J1,TJ1,F
)
∆τrs , (29)
which corresponds to the ‘∆τrs −∆αr Dynamics’ block in
Fig. 5. From Equations (24) and (29), we can express the
relationship between τrs and αr as shown in Block 3.
In Fig. 5, we can see that all the blocks except the
‘Servo Ctrler’ and ‘∆τrs−∆αr Dynamics’ blocks cancel out.
Therefore, we can obtain the final form of fail-safe torque
transfer function
ΛFS(s) =
τ1,O(s)
τ1,O,d(s)
=
ΛSC(s)ΛID(s)
1 + ΛSC(s)ΛID(s)
, (30)
where
ΛID(s) =
J1,T + J1,F
J1,TJ1,F s2 −mF dF g (31)
is the transfer function of ‘∆τrs − ∆αr ’ block correspond
to Eq. (29), and ΛSC(s) is a transfer function correspond to
the ‘Servo Ctrler’ block.
Based on the above results, we can now describe the input-
output relationship between ud and u as follows:
Λu(s) =
u(s)
ud(s)
= diag (Λt(s),Λf (s)) ,
Λt(s) = diag (Λt1(s),Λt2(s),Λt3(s)) ,
Λti(s) =
Ti,O(s)
Ti,O,d(s)
= ΛFS(s)
(32)
where Λt{1,2,3}(s),Λf (s) = 1 except for the Λti(s), which
becomes ΛFS(s) when the Mode i fail-safe flight algorithm
is activated.
IV. CONTROLLER DESIGN
In this section we introduce a fail-safe flight controller de-
sign. First, we introduce the faulty motor detection method,
along with the proposed fail-safe flight controller.
Fig. 6. The control scheme of the T 3-Multirotor with a fail-safe algorithm.
A. Faulty Motor Detection
Before the motor failure, both d{1,2},C values are all fixed
to zero. Then, the attitude control torque is generated only
by TT according to the rules in Eq. (6). In this case, the
rotational motion equation is derived from Eq. (14) and
becomes as follows.
(JT + JF ) q¨T = TT , q¨F = q¨T (33)
Also, under normal flight conditions, TT of u in Eq. (6)
has a limited range of values, and FT has a value near
Mg to overcome gravity, so roughly, each Fi maintains a
value near 0.25Mg. However, in the event of a single motor
failure, the platform can no longer compensate the torque
generated by the motor opposite the failed motor, resulting
in an abnormally large roll or pitch torque with a magnitude
of about 0.25lMg. From this fact, we can specify a faulty
motor by monitoring whether the angular acceleration values
q¨1,T or q¨2,T measured from IMU exceeds the conditions in
Table I. The value β ∈ R is derived from Eq. (33) and
defined as
β = γ
0.25lMg
J{1,2},T + J{1,2},F
, (34)
where the value γ ∈ R is a heuristically adjustable parameter.
B. Controller Design
Fig. 6-A shows the overall structure of the fail-safe flight
system designed to achieve the proposed fail-safe flight.
The system consists of four blocks: ‘Faulty Motor Detector
TABLE I
FAULTY MOTOR IDENTIFICATION TABLE
Condition Faulty Motor Condition Faulty Motor
q¨1,T > β Motor 4 (k = 4) q¨2,T > β Motor 3 (k = 3)
q¨1,T < −β Motor 2 (k = 2) q¨2,T < −β Motor 1 (k = 1)
(FMD)’, ‘Flight Controller (FC)’, ‘Signal Converter (SC)’,
and ‘Plant Dynamics (PD)’.
1) FMD Block: The Faulty Motor Detector identifies the
faulty motor k from Table I. The information of the faulty
motor is then sent to the ‘Flight Controller’ block and ’Signal
Converter’ block to activate Mode i fail-safe flight algorithm.
2) FC Block: Fig. 6-B illustrates the internal structure
of the Flight Controller Block. The role of this block is to
convert qT,d and FT,d into ud, where those signals are gen-
erated by the high-level controller (e.g. position controller)
or by the R/C controller. During normal flight, dedicated roll,
pitch and yaw feedback controllers (Λ{r,p,y}), which ensure
control stability and performance for the rotational motion of
Eq. (33), generate TT,d(=TT ) to control qT . However, in the
event of a motor failure, the roll and pitch dynamics changes
and therefore, dedicated fail-safe controllers (ΛFS{r,p}) are
configured to altered dynamics. Each roll and pitch controller
has a Mode i switch as in Fig. 6-B, where the FMD triggers
the ‘Mode 1 S/W’ when i = 1, and the ‘Mode 2 S/W’ when
i = 2.
As we see in Eq. (23), in the fail-safe flight mode, the
servomotor is the only actuator for controlling the crippled
attitude channel. However, the servo motor has significantly
slow response compared to the motor thruster due to their
inherent characteristics, which may causes destructive vibra-
tion when high-frequency control input is applied. To avoid
this issue, a low pass filter (ΛB(s)) is introduced to limit the
frequency of the control input applied to the servo motor. In
our research, a Bessel filter with the maximally flat phase
delay characteristics is introduced to prevent an additional
phase delay.
3) SC and PD blocks: For the SC block, the matrix is
first set to A−10 in normal flight. But in fail-safe flight, the
FMD triggers the block to change the matrix to A−1k (FT )
for generating fail-safe flight command ck,d.
For the PD block, the system characteristics differs in
normal and fail-safe flight. In normal flight, the transfer
function between TT,d (of ud) and qT is obtained from Eq.
(33). We define the relationship as
ΛNTA(s) =
qT (s)
TT (s)
= diag(ΛN1,TA(s),Λ
N
2,TA(s),Λ
N
3,TA(s)),
ΛNn,TA(s) =
1
(Jn,T + Jn,F )s2
, n = 1, 2, 3,
(35)
where TT,d(s) = TT (s) due to negligible rotor dynamics.
However, in a fail-safe flight mode, Eq. (13) governs the
qT motion and therefore, a new relationship of ΛFSTA(s) is
defined as follows.
ΛFSTA(s) =
{
diag(ΛFS1,TA(s) Λ
N
2,TA(s) Λ
N
3,TA(s)) (if i = 1)
diag(ΛN1,TA(s) Λ
FS
2,TA(s) Λ
N
3,TA(s)) (if i = 2)
,
ΛFSi,TA(s) =
qi,T (s)
Ti,O(s)
Λti(s) =
1
Ji,T s2
ΛFS(s)
(36)
Then, the input-output relationship between IX,d and IX
can be written as follows:
ΛI(s) =
IX(s)
IX,d(s)
= diag(Λ1,I(s),Λ2,I(s),Λ3,I(s),Λ4,I(s)),
Λ1,I(s) =

Λr(s)Λ
N
1,TA(s)
1+Λr(s)ΛN1,TA(s)
(if i 6= 1)
ΛFSr (s)Λ
FS
1,TA(s)
1+ΛFSr (s)Λ
FS
1,TA(s)
(if i = 1)
,
Λ2,I(s) =

Λp(s)Λ
N
2,TA(s)
1+Λp(s)ΛN2,TA(s)
(if i 6= 2)
ΛFSp (s)Λ
FS
2,TA(s)
1+ΛFSp (s)Λ
FS
2,TA(s)
(if i = 2)
,
Λ3,I(s) =
Λy(s)Λ
N
3,TA(s)
1 + Λy(s)ΛN3,TA(s)
, Λ4,I(s) = Λ
N
4,TA(s),
(37)
V. EXPERIMENT RESULT
A. Experimental Settings
The ‘T 3-Inverted’ platform in Fig. 3 is selected in the
experiment to prevent airflow obstruction of the thrusters
by the FP during relative attitude control.3 Table II shows
the hardware parameters and the controller gains of the
experimental platform. For controllers, PID controllers are
introduced in all of ΛSC(s), Λ{r,p,y}(s) and ΛFS{r,p}(s), and
the gains are set to make ΛI(s) a stable system. The
IX,d command is generated by the dedicated PID position
controller. However, the Bessel filter is limited to have a
cutoff frequency of 40 Hz due to the inherent characteristics
of the servomotor.
B. Flight Results
In the experiment, the motor failure is caused by the
operator triggering the stop signal of Motor 2 at any time.
Once the motor fails, the FMD identifies the failed motor
and activates the fail-safe roll control mode, whilst the pitch
channel remains the conventional control mode.
Fig. 7 shows the fail-safe flight results. The figure includes
the tracking results of the TP attitude, the three-dimensional
3See https://www.sjlazza.com/post/ra-l-2020 for hardware requirements
for fail-safe flight.
TABLE II
PHYSICAL QUANTITIES AND CONTROLLER GAINS OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM
Physical Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
mT 0.389 kg J{1,2},T ≈ 0.002 kg ·m2
mF 0.921 kg J3,T ≈ 0.01 kg ·m2
dT 0.02 m J{1,2},F ≈ 0.014 kg ·m2
dF 0.21 m J3,F ≈ 0.04 kg ·m2
l 0.15 m b/k ratio ≈ 0.05
Fmax 12.9 N -
Controller Gains
Gain Value Gain Value
Λ{r,p}(s) PID 3, 0.5, 0.3 ΛFS{r,p}(s) PID 0.1, 0.1, 0.24
ΛSC(s) PID 5, 0.1, 3 Λy(s) PID 0.3, 0.01, 0.06
Pos. PID 2, 0.5, 2 Height PID 10,1,1
ΛB cut-off freq. 40 Hz -
Fig. 7. [Fail-safe flight #1] [Red: ref. trajectory, Blue: tracking result]
Attitude and position tracking results before and after motor failure. Motor
2 failure occurred at around 26 seconds, which triggered Mode 1 fail-safe
flight controller.
platform position, the four propeller PWM control inputs,
and the relative roll attitude. From the PWM 2 command
log in the ‘Control Input’ graph, we can see that Motor 2
stopped rotating at about 26 seconds. After that, the FMD
triggers the Mode 1 fail-safe flight to control the servo motor
for restoring the crippled roll attitude. As a result, not only
the roll attitude control but also the position control was
successfully restored, and the x-direction position converged
to the target position within 10 seconds after the event.
Fig. 8 shows the tracking results when changing q3,T,d,
x1,T,d and x3,T,d values to validate heading, horizontal and
vertical motion control performance during fail-safe flight.
Experimental results show satisfactory heading and height
control performance. In the x1,T position control, however,
the reference trajectory tracking performance is reduced
compared to other channels. This is mainly due to the
limited cutoff frequency of the Bessel filter, which degrades
the ΛFS1,TA(s) performance, and the improvement of control
performance via the advanced control method, such as the
robust control method, remains a topic for future research.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a new quadcopter fail-safe
flight that utilizes a fully-actuated T 3 mechanism to maintain
all four c-DOF control capabilities in the event of a single
motor failure. The proposed method applied the strategy of
actively adjusting the CoG position of the fuselage to restore
the c-DOF of the system. A method for identifying faulty
motors using only accelerometer information is devised, and
a flight control system specialized for fail-safe flight to
isolate faulty motors has been constructed. To understand
the motion characteristics during fail-safe flight, equations
of motions in fail-safe flight are derived, and experimenal
results are proved to validate that the independent control
of roll, pitch, yaw and thrust is recovered by the proposed
method after a failure of single thruster.
This algorithm is advantageous in situations where the
system requires enhanced operation safety but also needs
Fig. 8. [Fail-safe flight #2] [Red: ref. trajectory, Blue: tracking result]
Reference trajectory tracking results when arbitrary q3,T,d, x1,T,d, and
x3,T,d commands are applied.
to suppress the additional hardware, such as parachutes or
additional thrusters that significantly increase the weight
or volume of the platform. It is also advantageous when
the flight relies on the built-in navigation systems that are
vulnerable to rotations, such as visual odometry cameras,
as the proposed method can ensure a stable attitude during
fail-safe flight.
REFERENCES
[1] Beard, Randal. ”Quadrotor dynamics and control rev 0.1.” (2008).
[2] Freddi et al. ”A feedback linearization approach to fault tolerance in
quadrotor vehicles.” IFAC, 2011: 5413-5418.
[3] Mueller et al. ”Stability and control of a quadrocopter despite the
complete loss of one, two, or three propellers.” ICRA. IEEE, 2014.
[4] Lippiello et al. ”Emergency landing for a quadrotor in case of a
propeller failure: A backstepping approach.” IROS. IEEE, 2014.
[5] Lippiello et al. ”Emergency landing for a quadrotor in case of a
propeller failure: A pid based approach.” SSRR. IEEE, 2014.
[6] Merheb et al. ”Emergency control of AR drone quadrotor UAV
suffering a total loss of one rotor.” IEEE/ASME T-Mech. 22.2 (2017):
961-971.
[7] Nemati et al. ”Stability and control of tilting-rotor quadcopter in case
of a propeller failure.” DSCC. 2016.
[8] Michieletto et al. ”Control of statically hoverable multi-rotor aerial
vehicles and application to rotor-failure robustness for hexarotors.”
ICRA. IEEE, 2017.
[9] Wang et al. ”An adaptive fault-tolerant sliding mode control allocation
scheme for multirotor helicopter subject to simultaneous actuator
faults.” IEEE TIE. 65.5 (2017): 4227-4236.
[10] Falcon et al. ”Hexacopter outdoor flight test results using adaptive con-
trol allocation subject to an unknown complete loss of one propeller.”
SysTol. IEEE, 2016.
[11] Shen et al. ”Vision-Based State Estimation and Trajectory Control
Towards High-Speed Flight with a Quadrotor.” RSS. Vol. 1. 2013.
[12] Michael D. Griffin and James R. French, Space Vehicle Design,
Second Edition.
[13] Lee et al. ”Design, Modeling and Control of T3-Multirotor: A Tilting
Thruster Type Multirotor.” ICRA. IEEE, 2018.
[14] Lee et al. ”Cargo Transportation Strategy using T 3-Multirotor UAV.”
ICRA. IEEE, 2019.
[15] Dong et al. ”High-performance trajectory tracking control of a quadro-
tor with disturbance observer.” Sensors and Actuators A: Physical 211
(2014): 67-77.
[16] Lee et al. ”Trajectory tracking control of multirotors from modelling
to experiments: A survey.” IJCAS. 15.1 (2017): 281-292.
[17] Lee et al. ”Robust Translational Force Control of Multi-Rotor UAV
for Precise Acceleration Tracking.” IEEE TASE. (2019).
